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How to revise a total preorder

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dc.contributor.author Booth, R
dc.contributor.author Meyer, T
dc.date.accessioned 2011-04-11T08:26:39Z
dc.date.available 2011-04-11T08:26:39Z
dc.date.issued 2011-02
dc.identifier.citation Booth, R and Meyer, T. 2011. How to revise a total preorder. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 40(2), pp 193-238. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0022-3611
dc.identifier.uri http://krr.meraka.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/jpl-booth-ea-2011.pdf
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10204/4950
dc.description Copyright: 2011 Springer. This is a pre print version of the work. The definitive version is published in Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 40(2), pp 193-238 en_US
dc.description.abstract Most approaches to iterated belief revision are accompanied by some motivation for the use of the proposed revision operator (or family of operators), and typically encode enough information in the epistemic state of an agent for uniquely determining one-step revision. But in those approaches describing a family of operators there is usually little indication of how to proceed uniquely after the first revision step. In this paper we contribute towards addressing that deficiency by providing a formal framework which goes beyond the first revision step in two ways. First, the framework is obtained by enriching the epistemic state of an agent starting from the following intuitive idea: we associate to each world x two abstract objects x+ and x−, and we assume that, in addition to preferences over the set of worlds, we are given preferences over this set of objects as well. The latter can be considered as meta-information encoded in the epistemic state which enables us to go beyond the first revision step of the revision operator being applied, and to obtain a unique set of preferences over worlds. We then extend this framework to consider, not only the revision of preferences over worlds, but also the revision of this extended structure itself. We look at some desirable properties for revising the structure and prove the consistency of these properties by giving a concrete operator satisfying all of them. Perhaps more importantly, we show that this framework has strong connections with two other types of constructions in related areas. Firstly, it can be seen as a special case of preference aggregation which opens up the possibility of extending the framework presented here into a full-fledged framework for preference aggregation and social choice theory. Secondly, it is related to existing work on the use of interval orderings in a number of different contexts. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Springer en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Workflow;6072
dc.subject Revision operator en_US
dc.subject Interval orderings en_US
dc.subject Preorder en_US
dc.subject Belief revision en_US
dc.subject Iterated belief revision en_US
dc.subject Philosophical logic en_US
dc.title How to revise a total preorder en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.identifier.apacitation Booth, R., & Meyer, T. (2011). How to revise a total preorder. http://hdl.handle.net/10204/4950 en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitation Booth, R, and T Meyer "How to revise a total preorder." (2011) http://hdl.handle.net/10204/4950 en_ZA
dc.identifier.vancouvercitation Booth R, Meyer T. How to revise a total preorder. 2011; http://hdl.handle.net/10204/4950. en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Article AU - Booth, R AU - Meyer, T AB - Most approaches to iterated belief revision are accompanied by some motivation for the use of the proposed revision operator (or family of operators), and typically encode enough information in the epistemic state of an agent for uniquely determining one-step revision. But in those approaches describing a family of operators there is usually little indication of how to proceed uniquely after the first revision step. In this paper we contribute towards addressing that deficiency by providing a formal framework which goes beyond the first revision step in two ways. First, the framework is obtained by enriching the epistemic state of an agent starting from the following intuitive idea: we associate to each world x two abstract objects x+ and x−, and we assume that, in addition to preferences over the set of worlds, we are given preferences over this set of objects as well. The latter can be considered as meta-information encoded in the epistemic state which enables us to go beyond the first revision step of the revision operator being applied, and to obtain a unique set of preferences over worlds. We then extend this framework to consider, not only the revision of preferences over worlds, but also the revision of this extended structure itself. We look at some desirable properties for revising the structure and prove the consistency of these properties by giving a concrete operator satisfying all of them. Perhaps more importantly, we show that this framework has strong connections with two other types of constructions in related areas. Firstly, it can be seen as a special case of preference aggregation which opens up the possibility of extending the framework presented here into a full-fledged framework for preference aggregation and social choice theory. Secondly, it is related to existing work on the use of interval orderings in a number of different contexts. DA - 2011-02 DB - ResearchSpace DP - CSIR KW - Revision operator KW - Interval orderings KW - Preorder KW - Belief revision KW - Iterated belief revision KW - Philosophical logic LK - https://researchspace.csir.co.za PY - 2011 SM - 0022-3611 T1 - How to revise a total preorder TI - How to revise a total preorder UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10204/4950 ER - en_ZA


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