Mpalane, KealebogaGasela, NEsiefarienrhe, BMTsague, HD2017-06-072017-06-072016-09Mpalane, K., Gasela, N., Esiefarienrhe, B.M. et al. 2016. Vulnerability of advanced encryption standard algorithm to differential power analysis attacks implemented on ATmega-128 microcontroller. 2016 Third International Conference On Artificial Intelligence And Pattern Recognition (AIPR), 19-21 September 2016, Lodz University of Technology, Poland, p. 70-74. DOI: 10.1109/ICAIPR.2016.7585214978-1-4673-9187-0DOI: 10.1109/ICAIPR.2016.7585214http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7585214/http://hdl.handle.net/10204/9172Copyright: 2016 IEEE. Due to copyright restrictions, the attached PDF file only contains the abstract of the full text item. For access to the full text item, please consult the publisher's website.A wide variety of cryptographic embedded devices including smartcards, ASICs and FPGAs must be secure against breaking in. However, these devices are vulnerable to side channel attacks. A side channel attack uses physical attributes such as differences in the power consumption measured from the physical implementation of the cryptosystem while it is performing cryptographic operations to determine the secret key of the device. This paper investigates the vulnerability of 128-bits advanced encryption standard(AES) cryptographic algorithm implementation in a microcontroller crypto-device against differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. ChipWhisperer capture hardware Rev2 tool was used to collect 1000 power traces for DPA. We observed and measured the behaviour of the power consumption of the microcontroller while it was encrypting 1000 randomly generated plaintexts using the same secret key throughout. Our attack was successful in revealing all the 16 bytes (128-bits) of the secret key and the results demonstrated that the AES implementation can be broken using 1000 encryption operations.enCryptographic embedded deviceSmartcardsAdvanced encryption standardAESDifferential power analysisDPAMicrocontrollerConference PresentationMpalane, K., Gasela, N., Esiefarienrhe, B., & Tsague, H. (2016). Vulnerability of advanced encryption standard algorithm to differential power analysis attacks implemented on ATmega-128 microcontroller. IEEE. http://hdl.handle.net/10204/9172Mpalane, Kealeboga, N Gasela, BM Esiefarienrhe, and HD Tsague. "Vulnerability of advanced encryption standard algorithm to differential power analysis attacks implemented on ATmega-128 microcontroller." (2016): http://hdl.handle.net/10204/9172Mpalane K, Gasela N, Esiefarienrhe B, Tsague H, Vulnerability of advanced encryption standard algorithm to differential power analysis attacks implemented on ATmega-128 microcontroller; IEEE; 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10204/9172 .TY - Conference Presentation AU - Mpalane, Kealeboga AU - Gasela, N AU - Esiefarienrhe, BM AU - Tsague, HD AB - A wide variety of cryptographic embedded devices including smartcards, ASICs and FPGAs must be secure against breaking in. However, these devices are vulnerable to side channel attacks. A side channel attack uses physical attributes such as differences in the power consumption measured from the physical implementation of the cryptosystem while it is performing cryptographic operations to determine the secret key of the device. This paper investigates the vulnerability of 128-bits advanced encryption standard(AES) cryptographic algorithm implementation in a microcontroller crypto-device against differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. ChipWhisperer capture hardware Rev2 tool was used to collect 1000 power traces for DPA. We observed and measured the behaviour of the power consumption of the microcontroller while it was encrypting 1000 randomly generated plaintexts using the same secret key throughout. Our attack was successful in revealing all the 16 bytes (128-bits) of the secret key and the results demonstrated that the AES implementation can be broken using 1000 encryption operations. DA - 2016-09 DB - ResearchSpace DP - CSIR KW - Cryptographic embedded device KW - Smartcards KW - Advanced encryption standard KW - AES KW - Differential power analysis KW - DPA KW - Microcontroller LK - https://researchspace.csir.co.za PY - 2016 SM - 978-1-4673-9187-0 T1 - Vulnerability of advanced encryption standard algorithm to differential power analysis attacks implemented on ATmega-128 microcontroller TI - Vulnerability of advanced encryption standard algorithm to differential power analysis attacks implemented on ATmega-128 microcontroller UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10204/9172 ER -