Engelbrecht, GNVos, AP2009-08-212009-08-212009-07Engelbrecht, GN and Vos, AP. 2009. On the use of the shapley value in political conflict resolution. Scientia Militaria, Vol. 37(1). pp 73-941022-8136http://hdl.handle.net/10204/3538Copyright: 2009 Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityThis article delineates generic causes to internal conflict and proposes a coalition-forming methodology to allow for power sharing as one avenue of conflict resolution. A suitable framework to study causes to internal conflict should, at least, provide for big bad men versus people under pressure, recent versus historic events and an internal versus an external emphasis that may be employed to understand the rationale for internal conflict. As long as aggrieved parties are not allowed to address their grievances adequately, political conflict will emerge and, if not addressed timely, such conflict may lead to civil war. A conflict resolution mechanism based on the Shapley value is proposed to deal with internal conflict. The allocation of delegates, derived so that all parties have a say commensurate with their support bases, should allow for formal consensus to take place more readily than in cases where a particular party’s representation in such a forum dominates the representation of the other parties. An algorithm to determine the number of votes or seats allocated to each of the parties to ensure equitable power sharing is also given. The causal reasons for internal conflict and the proposed methodology to deal with such conflict was presented to prominent South African politicians and political scientists for comment. A favourable response regarding their acceptance of the methodology was elucidated.enShapley valuePolitical conflict resolutionInternal conflictCivil warGame theoryCoalition-forming methodologyConflict resolutionMilitary scienceScientia militariaArticleEngelbrecht, G., & Vos, A. (2009). On the use of the shapley value in political conflict resolution. http://hdl.handle.net/10204/3538Engelbrecht, GN, and AP Vos "On the use of the shapley value in political conflict resolution." (2009) http://hdl.handle.net/10204/3538Engelbrecht G, Vos A. On the use of the shapley value in political conflict resolution. 2009; http://hdl.handle.net/10204/3538.TY - Article AU - Engelbrecht, GN AU - Vos, AP AB - This article delineates generic causes to internal conflict and proposes a coalition-forming methodology to allow for power sharing as one avenue of conflict resolution. A suitable framework to study causes to internal conflict should, at least, provide for big bad men versus people under pressure, recent versus historic events and an internal versus an external emphasis that may be employed to understand the rationale for internal conflict. As long as aggrieved parties are not allowed to address their grievances adequately, political conflict will emerge and, if not addressed timely, such conflict may lead to civil war. A conflict resolution mechanism based on the Shapley value is proposed to deal with internal conflict. The allocation of delegates, derived so that all parties have a say commensurate with their support bases, should allow for formal consensus to take place more readily than in cases where a particular party’s representation in such a forum dominates the representation of the other parties. An algorithm to determine the number of votes or seats allocated to each of the parties to ensure equitable power sharing is also given. The causal reasons for internal conflict and the proposed methodology to deal with such conflict was presented to prominent South African politicians and political scientists for comment. A favourable response regarding their acceptance of the methodology was elucidated. DA - 2009-07 DB - ResearchSpace DP - CSIR KW - Shapley value KW - Political conflict resolution KW - Internal conflict KW - Civil war KW - Game theory KW - Coalition-forming methodology KW - Conflict resolution KW - Military science KW - Scientia militaria LK - https://researchspace.csir.co.za PY - 2009 SM - 1022-8136 T1 - On the use of the shapley value in political conflict resolution TI - On the use of the shapley value in political conflict resolution UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10204/3538 ER -