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Survey on the cryptanalysis of wireless sensor networks using side-channel analysis

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dc.contributor.author Moabalobelo, Terrence
dc.contributor.author Nelwamondo, Fulufhelo V
dc.contributor.author Tsague, HD
dc.date.accessioned 2012-09-27T12:58:14Z
dc.date.available 2012-09-27T12:58:14Z
dc.date.issued 2012-09
dc.identifier.citation Moabalobelo, T, Nelwamondo, F and Tsague, HD. Survey on the cryptanalysis of wireless sensor networks using side-channel analysis. Southern Africa Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (SATNAC), George, Western Cape, 2-5 September 2012 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10204/6107
dc.description Southern Africa Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (SATNAC), George, Western Cape, 2-5 September 2012 en_US
dc.description.abstract Since the inception of side channel attacks, research has gone a long way in proving that embedded devices capable of running cryptographic algorithms are highly susceptible to these attacks. These attacks are non-invasive in which an attacker can obtain confidential information such as secret keys by simply observing the side channel information leakage (such as the power consumption, timing, and electromagnetic emanations). Wireless sensor networks are particularly vulnerable to these attacks as they are deployed in open environments with no protective physical shielding. In this survey paper, we give an overview of the side channel attacks (particularly power analysis attacks) against wireless sensor networks and in addition discuss some of the suggested countermeasures against power analysis attacks. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Workflow;9547
dc.subject Wireless sensor networks en_US
dc.subject Power analysis attacks en_US
dc.subject Side channel attacks en_US
dc.subject Countermeasures en_US
dc.subject Attacks en_US
dc.title Survey on the cryptanalysis of wireless sensor networks using side-channel analysis en_US
dc.type Conference Presentation en_US
dc.identifier.apacitation Moabalobelo, T., Nelwamondo, F. V., & Tsague, H. (2012). Survey on the cryptanalysis of wireless sensor networks using side-channel analysis. http://hdl.handle.net/10204/6107 en_ZA
dc.identifier.chicagocitation Moabalobelo, T, Fulufhelo V Nelwamondo, and HD Tsague. "Survey on the cryptanalysis of wireless sensor networks using side-channel analysis." (2012): http://hdl.handle.net/10204/6107 en_ZA
dc.identifier.vancouvercitation Moabalobelo T, Nelwamondo FV, Tsague H, Survey on the cryptanalysis of wireless sensor networks using side-channel analysis; 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10204/6107 . en_ZA
dc.identifier.ris TY - Conference Presentation AU - Moabalobelo, T AU - Nelwamondo, Fulufhelo V AU - Tsague, HD AB - Since the inception of side channel attacks, research has gone a long way in proving that embedded devices capable of running cryptographic algorithms are highly susceptible to these attacks. These attacks are non-invasive in which an attacker can obtain confidential information such as secret keys by simply observing the side channel information leakage (such as the power consumption, timing, and electromagnetic emanations). Wireless sensor networks are particularly vulnerable to these attacks as they are deployed in open environments with no protective physical shielding. In this survey paper, we give an overview of the side channel attacks (particularly power analysis attacks) against wireless sensor networks and in addition discuss some of the suggested countermeasures against power analysis attacks. DA - 2012-09 DB - ResearchSpace DP - CSIR KW - Wireless sensor networks KW - Power analysis attacks KW - Side channel attacks KW - Countermeasures KW - Attacks LK - https://researchspace.csir.co.za PY - 2012 T1 - Survey on the cryptanalysis of wireless sensor networks using side-channel analysis TI - Survey on the cryptanalysis of wireless sensor networks using side-channel analysis UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10204/6107 ER - en_ZA


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