dc.contributor.author |
Booth, R
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Meyer, T
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2011-10-12T10:41:16Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2011-10-12T10:41:16Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2010-08 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
Booth, R and Meyer, T. 2010. Equilibria in social belief removal. Synthese, Vol 177, pp 337-363 |
en_US |
dc.identifier.issn |
0039-7857 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://www.springerlink.com/content/g706t60g35q66508/
|
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10204/5230
|
|
dc.description |
Copyright: 2010 Springer Verlag Germany. This is a pre print version of the paper. The definitive version is published in Synthese, Vol 177, pp 337-363 |
en_US |
dc.description.abstract |
In studies of multi-agent interaction, especially in game theory, the notion of equilibrium often plays a prominent role. A typical scenario for the belief merging problem is one in which several agents pool their beliefs together to form a consistent “group” picture of the world. The aim of this paper is to define and study new notions of equilibria in belief merging. To do so, we assume the agents arrive at consistency via the use of a social belief removal function, in which each agent, using his own individual removal function, removes some belief from his stock of beliefs. We examine several notions of equilibria in this setting, assuming a general framework for individual belief removal due to Booth et al. We look at their inter-relations as well as prove their existence or otherwise. We also show how our equilibria can be seen as a generalisation of the idea of taking maximal consistent subsets of agents. |
en_US |
dc.language.iso |
en |
en_US |
dc.publisher |
Springer Verlag (Germany) |
en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Workflow request;4417 |
|
dc.subject |
Equilibrium |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Social belief removal |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Game theory |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Belief removal |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Belief revision |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Belief merging |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Multi agent systems |
en_US |
dc.title |
Equilibria in social belief removal [Journal article] |
en_US |
dc.type |
Article |
en_US |
dc.identifier.apacitation |
Booth, R., & Meyer, T. (2010). Equilibria in social belief removal [Journal article]. http://hdl.handle.net/10204/5230 |
en_ZA |
dc.identifier.chicagocitation |
Booth, R, and T Meyer "Equilibria in social belief removal [Journal article]." (2010) http://hdl.handle.net/10204/5230 |
en_ZA |
dc.identifier.vancouvercitation |
Booth R, Meyer T. Equilibria in social belief removal [Journal article]. 2010; http://hdl.handle.net/10204/5230. |
en_ZA |
dc.identifier.ris |
TY - Article
AU - Booth, R
AU - Meyer, T
AB - In studies of multi-agent interaction, especially in game theory, the notion of equilibrium often plays a prominent role. A typical scenario for the belief merging problem is one in which several agents pool their beliefs together to form a consistent “group” picture of the world. The aim of this paper is to define and study new notions of equilibria in belief merging. To do so, we assume the agents arrive at consistency via the use of a social belief removal function, in which each agent, using his own individual removal function, removes some belief from his stock of beliefs. We examine several notions of equilibria in this setting, assuming a general framework for individual belief removal due to Booth et al. We look at their inter-relations as well as prove their existence or otherwise. We also show how our equilibria can be seen as a generalisation of the idea of taking maximal consistent subsets of agents.
DA - 2010-08
DB - ResearchSpace
DP - CSIR
KW - Equilibrium
KW - Social belief removal
KW - Game theory
KW - Belief removal
KW - Belief revision
KW - Belief merging
KW - Multi agent systems
LK - https://researchspace.csir.co.za
PY - 2010
SM - 0039-7857
T1 - Equilibria in social belief removal [Journal article]
TI - Equilibria in social belief removal [Journal article]
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10204/5230
ER -
|
en_ZA |