I. INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the functional gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding (or ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction) has received a lot of attention because it remains a weakness in the policy framework of the United Nations (UN) conflict resolution repertoire, particularly in peace missions. This view is underscored by the UN’s own concern with not being able to effectively bridge the security-development gap in transitional periods, as was clearly revealed when the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, once remarked:

‘[UN] mission planning remains far from perfect [and] as a result, we have peacekeeping operations that succeed, only to lapse back into conflict. Successful operations, as it were, in which the patient dies.’

Guéhenno’s comments are especially true in Africa, currently the region with the highest concentration of large costly multi-dimensional peace missions. Across the Continent, ceasefires and peace agreements are fragile; and while UN peacekeeping frequently fails to effectively disarm and demobilise combatants, peacebuilding efforts struggle to reintegrate former ones leading to societies in transition often relapsing into violent conflict in the face of chronic unemployment, poverty, famine and disease. Evidently, there is a need for an alternative approach to respond to contemporary armed conflict and to assist countries recovering from war.

One important approach was highlighted by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1998, and later reiterated in his report titled, In Larger Freedom (2005), in which he noted that peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be designed as simultaneous activities, used in combination and as complements to one another in the field. However, in spite of strategic level implementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel, including the ‘Integrated Missions’ concept and approach, UN attempts to bring security to development have largely left the traditional boundaries between peacekeeping and peacebuilding still distinct to this day. For instance, the two activities are not integrated within the UN bureaucracy, but have separate institutional homes, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the recently inaugurated Peacebuilding Commission.

But why is it necessary to bridge the divide between security and development in peace missions? More importantly, is this idea welcome or even practicable? While the debate over the proper roles of, and relationship between, military peacekeepers and civilian humanitarian and developmental actors is relatively young and not thoroughly researched, one thing is certain: the causes of contemporary conflicts are too complex to be addressed by security interventions alone. This is especially true if one considers two enduring lessons that the UN has

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2 Aside from the longitudinal research undertaken by World Bank researcher Paul Collier and others regarding the sustainability of peace efforts, one UN report estimates that roughly half of all peace missions have a chance at succeeding after the signing of peace agreements. The chances appear to be even slimmer when warring parties fight for control over valuable resources. See, UNDG/ECHA Working Group, Report on Transition Issues, February 2004, p. 14.

learned through years of experience in responding to conflict. Firstly, successful peace missions require integrated efforts at the strategic and operational levels, and not separate tracks that do not converge. Secondly, speed and momentum do matter in peace mission interventions.

Today, the UN system is re-structuring to deal with these and other important peacekeeping lessons. The recent establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission—intended to fill the institutional gap between military peacekeeping and development activities, and to strengthen UN capacity for peacebuilding—is a case in point. Although noteworthy, UN reform is regrettably guided by a time-honoured, but questionable, concept of peace operations, namely that security is a precursor to the reconstruction and development dimensions of peacebuilding.

The concept of ‘Developmental Peace Missions’ aims to challenge the traditional view that short-term military security is a necessary pre-condition for long-term development. To the contrary, it proposes that military operations can prove counterproductive if continued to long, and not complemented with real economic growth and social upliftment. This article offers a first cut at substantiating this claim by exploring how initial civilian reconstruction efforts can enhance military peacekeeping, and, at the same time, create the momentum needed for successful transitions.

II. CONCEPTUAL ARGUMENT

A fundamental assumption of modern peace missions is that military security is a priority, based on the pervasive notion that reconstruction and development can only start once fighting between warring parties has stopped. Consequently, when a crisis emerges, decision-makers tend to spend more time planning for military operations rather than planning for long-term development. Because of this, peace missions are designed to mobilise and deploy military peacekeepers first to control violence. As a rule, this effort usually entails trying to separate warring factions and assisting with their withdrawal from a demarcated cease-fire zone. This approach is informed by the assumption that the separation of warring factions by military peacekeepers will create a safe environment for disarmament and demobilisation and for wider peacebuilding activities. The peacekeeping and peacebuilding timeline gap is depicted in Figure.

Figure 1: The peacekeeping-peacebuilding gap

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4 Figures 1 and 2 are adapted from Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E Johnson, Transforming for stabilisation and reconstruction operations, Centre for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defence University, National Defence University Press, 2004, pp. xv-xvi.
However, while this may very well be the case, the preoccupation with establishing the military security of a post-conflict state often results in a more dominant role by military forces in peace missions; invariably, such military deployments are amply resourced, while critical peacebuilding initiatives take the back seat because of insufficient funding. But even though military peacekeeping may work well when sufficient numbers of heavily-armed soldiers impose peace on the ground, local support for ‘blue helmet’ troops and transitional administrations dangerously declines as expectations of improved standards of living are not sufficiently met. The overall result of peacekeeping—particularly in Africa—is that conflicts keep smouldering below a deceptive surface of peacemaking and peacekeeping, while post-conflict countries fail to move from war to lasting peace.

In consideration of these factors, we contend that peacekeeping operations often fail to provide the necessary security for the foundations on which development can proceed because they are not designed to provide a fundamental element of security and stability, namely baseline infrastructure—water, transport, energy, and telecommunications—that is vital for the functioning of a state and for society.

The importance of socio-economic infrastructure to modern society is fairly obvious: it provides the basis for human capital, the provision of state goods and services, and enables the creation and functioning of public and private institutions. In Africa, direct war damage and the neglect of infrastructure maintenance during war has left several governments with deteriorated, sometimes non-existent, capacity to provide essential services to populations. The failure or inability of state institutions to deliver public services can be a crucial cause of conflict and instability, in so far as ordinary citizens may engage in alternative forms of wealth creation, usually violence and crime, to escape poverty.

The point is, unwinding armed conflict and the elaborate networks behind it means not only going after those involved (difficult enough as this is anyway), but also lifting people out of poverty and promoting more sustainable livelihoods. Yet, the idea of putting in place critical infrastructure in what has traditionally been seen as ‘military peacekeeping space’ raises significant issues in terms of the way UN decision-makers have normally conceptualised, planned and implemented peacekeeping missions. On a conceptual level—and this point was first recognised by Kaldor and later by Brahimi—it requires understanding the importance of utilising development as both a ‘pre-war’ and ‘post-war’ strategy, aiming at both the prevention and cure of the underlying causes of conflict. On a planning level—yet to materialise—it means integrating infrastructure development planning from early on with peacekeeping planning. On an operational level—no doubt a contentious point—it means changing the way peacekeeping operations are staffed to support, inter alia, the deployment of civilians alongside soldiers in order to jumpstart essential reconstruction efforts. The establishment of this sort of civilian capacity is important because it may serve to shorten the duration of fragile transition periods.

Increased civil-military cooperation does not necessarily mean increased military engagement in humanitarian and developmental aid; there is always the danger of the military ‘politicising’

5 Interview with Dr. Adi Paterson, Group Executive (DDG): Science and Technology Expert Services, South African Department of Science and Technology, 11 August 2006.
such activities. Rather, it emphasises, firstly, the need to reconcile military and civilian planning procedures before operations begin. Secondly, it accentuates the importance of drawing on the relative capabilities of both the military and civilians and recognising the complementary benefits of using both from the outset.

True, sustained efforts to promote infrastructure development will be difficult in areas where armed attacks are frequent. The experiences in countries, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, where warlords and militia have controlled most of the country, and where the international community has been unwilling or unable to send a strong force, particularly during the 1990s, suggest that the idea of placing the lives of international personnel in extremely dangerous environments is simply unrealistic. However, it is also true that an over-protective view of civilian personnel in peace missions is bound to contribute to the widening of the gap between security and developmental efforts, and possibly place the whole mission in jeopardy. For that reason, planners should ensure the rapid concurrent build-up of civilian and military assets in peace missions, and that the initial mission mix should contain a fair amount of capability to kick-start reconstruction and development.

III. UN COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS

The term ‘complex peace operation’, sometimes referred to as ‘multi-dimensional peacekeeping’, is an expression that is often used by UN officials to denote the inclusion of post-conflict peacebuilding activities into peacekeeping mandates that are authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC). At the policy level, the UN uses a number of instruments to respond to conflicts. Four of these instruments are conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.9 Significantly, the UN’s shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and multi-dimensional operations in the post-Cold War world has entailed a gradual division of labour between UN soldiers and civilian personnel contracted by the DPKO. In the past, civilians mostly undertook mission support roles for the military, including finance, personnel, administration and logistics. Today, civilian roles have grown to include units that specialise in political affairs, legal advice, civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, gender, child protection, electoral, disarmament and demobilisation, and public information. It is important to mention, however, that these units typically serve as focal points for coordination and liaison between DPKO and the myriad of international and local civilian agencies that are integrated with or work alongside the peace operation.10 In other words, they have no real implementation capability.

The UN’s recent inclusion of ‘Quick-Impact-Projects’ (QIPs) in the budgets of most new peace operations, such as those in Liberia (UNMIL) and Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), represents another good example of how UN thinking about peacekeeping has evolved beyond the traditional model of military operations. QIPs are short-term, small-scale infrastructure projects, including but not limited to rebuilding strategic roads and bridges or restoring electricity and water supply in critical areas, and are aimed at making early improvements in a local population’s quality of

9 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 2000. It is significant that this report does not include peace enforcement operations as part of the UN’s repertoire to respond to conflict. Instead, it firmly states: ‘the United Nations does not wage war, [but when] enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorisation of the Security Council’ (p. 10, paragraph 53). See also, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/50/60 – S/1995/1), 3 January 1995. In this document, the UN Secretary-General, reporting on the work of the Organisation, outlined six instruments, namely: 1) preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; 2) peacekeeping; 3) post-conflict peacebuilding; 4) disarmament; 5) sanctions; and 6) enforcement action.

QIPs are usually identified and implemented by the military component of complex peace operations. Because of this, it has been suggesting that QIPs are actually conducted for the sake of publicity and political gain ('heart and minds'), and for ensuring the success of military operations. Thus, even at their outer limits, complex peace operations are not, as it were, 'integrated peacekeeping-peacebuilding' missions. If anything, they have been predominantly military in nature, and remain founded on the same (traditional peacekeeping) premise of trying to separate warring factions through military interposition. By separating warring factions, the UN assumes that the presence of 'impartial' military troops will create an enabling environment for political tasks, the implementation of peace agreements, and disarmament and demobilisation, as well as for UN and non-UN agencies to undertake emergency 'post-conflict' humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding and reconstruction.

While numerous examples exist that suggest that peacekeeping mandates are usually 'completed', there is unfortunately little evidence to suggest that the actual accomplishment of peacekeeping mandates necessarily translates into predictable and sustained financing, as well as concrete international attention to local peacebuilding activities. Even in cases where the peacekeeping phase of UN engagement has been hailed to end civil wars and establish enough stability for peacebuilding to begin, as is often claimed, for example, in respect of Sierra Leone, considerable weaknesses remain in local government capacity to deliver social services to local populations. To the contrary, Pugh for instance points out that in Sierra Leone, 'many of the challenges noted in the December 2005 Secretary-General’s report on [the UN mission in Sierra Leone] are the same challenges noted in the June 2002 report'. This suggests that the peacekeeping mission made little progress in stabilising the state’s shaky foundations. Needless to say, a study of the UN mandate of the UN mission in Sierra Leone reveals that it did not explicitly include peacebuilding tasks.

Broadly speaking, the recurring scenario of host-governments lacking basic systems and equipment to deliver basic services to society is commonly acknowledged as being symptomatic of the economic malaise of counties in conflict. In reaction to this, some analysts

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15 Michael Pugh, Why peacekeepers should focus on peacekeeping not peacebuilding, University of Bradford, 2006, unpublished paper.

17 The relationship between war and economy has given rise to what some refer to as a ‘war economy’, an economic system based on violence in which profit is generated not out of a final military victory (much like a civilian economy in times of war) but out of war itself. See, for example: Karen Ballentine, ‘Program on economic agendas in civil wars: principle research findings and policy recommendations’, International Peace Academy, April 2004; William Reno, Warlord Politics and the African State, Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Colorado, 1998; Mark Duffield, ‘Globalisation and war economies: promoting order or the return of history’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 23/2, Fall 1999.
have become increasingly concerned with the idea of strengthening the level of civilian capacity deployed during and after peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{18} Actually, throughout the 1990s there were repeated calls within the UN system for contributing states to create specialised units of ‘white helmets’,\textsuperscript{19} composed of civilian experts equipped to take on the rebuilding tasks of peacebuilding, leaving military security challenges firmly in the domain of blue helmets.

Despite the increased quantitative and qualitative demand for civilians in multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary missions, few UN-contributing countries have paid sufficient attention to the need to systematically enhance their capacities for peacebuilding. Not surprisingly, civilian experts—especially in reconstruction—are in short supply in peace missions. In this regard, Guéhenno underscores the underlying problem: the armed forces usually play a more dominant role in UN operations because they are so much easier to deploy—that is, unlike civil servants, they work under a common strategic framework, operate under a permanent budget, and have systems in place that allow for rapid deployment.\textsuperscript{20}

The reasons for the lack of investment in developing robust peacebuilding capabilities at country-level are not hard to find. The more obvious of these, perhaps, is that protecting the national interest has always been more important than responding to international humanitarian crisis. In other words: why bother developing or enhancing national capabilities for peacebuilding when outside humanitarian concerns do not directly threaten the national interest? Also, in the likely event that such concerns do threaten national security, a basic operational principle underpinning peacekeeping has been to achieve military stability, and then worry later about reconstruction. In other words: if security is a pre-requisite for development, why should state institutions concern themselves with providing humanitarian and developmental assistance when donor agencies and the international community can probably do a better job?

The net effects of these and other issues can be summarised as follows: first, reconstruction and development activities have not been regarded as a core function of the UN System and contributing countries; second, most of these countries have lacked any specific coordinating entity to deal with the challenges posed by peacebuilding; third, the lack of integrated inter-departmental strategies has contributed to the clouding of priorities, the inefficient use of (limited) resources, and the reactive nature of responses; and lastly, in the event of an emerging crisis, civilians have not been organised, equipped, and trained to deploy in the same fashion as their military counterparts.

In truth, the above-mentioned issues are not likely to be addressed until the UN system and contributing states decide to enhance national capabilities for peacebuilding. In the case of the United States of America (USA), the decision to establish in July 2004 the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation (S/CRS)—a new government unit mandated to establish and manage a standing civilian capacity for reconstruction—was due to the debacle of post-war planning for Iraq, and the threat posed by failed states harbouring international terrorism groups.\textsuperscript{21} This approach is similar in the case of the United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to

\textsuperscript{18} See for example, Wibke Hansen, Oliver Ramsbothan, and Tom Woodhouse, Haws and Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, Bergof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, March 2001, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{19} Particular reference is made to the draft UN Resolution A-50-19 (1995) that was proposed by Argentina.

\textsuperscript{20} Remarks made by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, at a workshop on the theme, State-building and strengthening of civilian administration in post-conflict societies and failed states, 21 June 2004, New York, hosted by the Crises Management Initiative (CMI) and the International Peace Academy (IPA).

\textsuperscript{21} After the 11 September 2001 attacks, failing states (eventually) mattered to America because they were now considered as posing a serious threat to its national security. This perception, therefore, substantially reinforced views among American policy-makers that it was important to have an enhanced civilian capacity in government that could help stabilise and reconstruct states that could potentially harbour international terrorist and organised crime networks. See Nina M. Serafino and
create the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) in September 2004. In Africa, however, the ‘usual suspects’ contributing to the outbreak or renewal of war—pervasive corruption, bad governance, lack of the rule of law and respect for human rights—have heightened socio-economic inequalities, including unemployment and the decay of basic infrastructure. These factors have long been considered as being anathema to the Continent’s development agenda and the achievement of the Millennium Developmental Goals. In spite of that, lofty policy commitments have yet to be translated into concrete tools to enable African actors to use peacebuilding as a strategy to achieve peace, and not only as a strategy to be implemented after peace has been established.\footnote{22}

The concept of developmental peace missions seeks to redirect strict adherence to the bedrock strategies of peacekeeping, focusing on the traditional separation of warring parties and prioritising military security. In this regard, the concept, above all, proposes that in order to ensure successful transition in peace missions, the UN system and contributing countries should consider mainstreaming critical civilian capabilities to augment the military security function and, at the same time, to properly address the unique challenges of long-term peacebuilding.

IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE MISSIONS

According to former Director of the UN Development Programme’s Emergency Response Division, Omar Bakhet, UN efforts in ‘East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone all demonstrate the clear need to integrate development into peace operations from early on’.\footnote{23} Undoubtedly, many conflict prevention and resolution practitioners would agree with Bakhet’s underlying argument that today’s conflicts require multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary approaches. In theory, this implies three important things: first, no single solution or response to armed conflict is, per se, more important than the other; second, there should be no fixed order of precedence in the actualisation of peace mission goals (that is to say, security is not necessarily a precursor for development); and third, the use of the military instruments to stabilise security environments will be insufficient if applied independently from other essential peace mission tasks. These three basic principles—interrelatedness, simultaneity and complementarity—root the concept of developmental peace missions.\footnote{24}

This concept of developmental peace missions, originally termed ‘developmental peacekeeping’, was first introduced by former South African Deputy-Minister of Defence, Ms. Nozizwe Madlala-Roudledge.\footnote{25} Madlala-Roudledge argued that military peacekeeping efforts...
should run concurrently with an equally vital aspect of an overall peace plan, which is the commitment to reconstruction and development, that is, to human security. She reasoned further, as had Annan previously in 1998, that an alternative approach to end violent conflict demands filling the institutional and programming void between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, implying these two activities should be, firstly, bridged and then ‘rolled-out’ as mutually reinforcing processes. This new approach is portrayed in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Targeting the gap: Developmental Peace Missions**

While the principle behind juxtaposing or merging peacekeeping with peacebuilding is hardly new, there is still much to learn, institutionally and operationally, about how the two interventions can best be applied in practice. Arguably, the recent US-led coalition intervention in Iraq has been an important catalyst for increased strategic debate concerning enhanced military and civilian coordination. As one writer recently observed in an article in the Wall Street Journal, ‘Early [military] decisions in Iraq [are] haunting current reconstruction efforts.’ The article seems to imply that the coalition should have spent more time planning winning the peace in Iraq rather than simply winning the war. Of course, Iraq was not a ‘genuine’ peace intervention. Nevertheless, few can deny that the conflict in Iraq has served to highlight to the wider international community the dangers of being unable to begin reconstruction promptly following major military action.

**Key assumptions**

The concept of developmental peace missions seeks to directly challenge the traditional and questionable dichotomy between providing short-term military security and long-term development in peace missions. The concept is based on the premise that security can only achieve permanent benefit if vital peacebuilding activities are rolled-out within reasonable time after the start of the peacekeeping mission. By ‘reasonable’, it is understood to mean providing critical reconstruction and development capabilities immediately after or ideally concurrently with the launch of the military peacekeeping operations. This combined effort will entail increased collaborative planning and information sharing between the military and civilians (i.e.

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'integrated planning'). It was also entail deploying technical experts in infrastructure planning and finance alongside soldiers to fast-track the process of reconstruction in conflict-ridden communities (i.e. 'integrated action'). Clearly, there are very practical problems if civilian personnel are expected to operate side-by-side with military forces at the onset of a mission, but these challenges can, and should, be overcome. If not, peacemaking efforts may help to successfully negotiate peace agreements, but will not necessarily create the (economic) incentives for locals to support peace processes over the long-haul.

A key task of planners to mitigate or reduce the scope for more conflict will be to decide on the length of the time interval between initial military response and full-scale developmental assistance. An interval too short might place the lives of international civilian personnel in excessive danger; one too long might well negate the benefits derivable from the initial military intervention. Experience has shown that the window of opportunity for reconstruction to start is very narrow: the first few months—if not weeks—following an intervention are perhaps the more critical period for laying the ‘groundwork’ for lasting peace and establishing the credibility of peace mission interventions. Conversely, legitimacy and political momentum lost during this critical period can be difficult to regain, especially if such interventions are unable to satisfactory deal with systematic threats to human security of the civilian population in the conflict country.

Clearly, early integrated approaches of peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions will not guarantee success, but will make a considerable contribution to that end. Ultimately, the transfer of power, resources and capacities to local actors will define the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding on the ground. Therefore, it is vital that immediate relief and reconstruction efforts build—not replace—local capacities. Not only will such efforts create jobs and tap local expertise, but also provide local populations with concrete alternatives other than relying on violence and crime for sustenance. This point cannot be overstressed. Without sufficient local demand for peace and reform, efforts to re-build broken states will, in all likelihood, fail.

**What needs to be done?**

While the civilian reconstruction dimension of preventing a return to conflict is increasingly acknowledged by policy-makers and academics alike, the challenge remains to enhance the international community’s capability to deal more effectively and professionally with destroyed states. This effort will require addressing a number of important issues. First and foremost on the list, as always, is the issue of funding. A recurring problem with peacebuilding operations is that international donors often fail to deliver on their pledges to fund these operations. Although this is an issue that falls beyond the scope of this paper, it suffices to say that the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission plans to serve as a central node for marshalling international resources for peacebuilding in a sustained and concerted manner.

Second, the problem of independent planning and action in the field must be tackled. This is because the lack of coordination and complementarity between UN actors and departments has prevented otherwise sound reconstruction strategies from being converted into concrete, sustained achievements. To this end, the UN has already undertaken significant steps towards improving internal coordination of military and civilian assets on the ground, in line with the recommendations made in the ‘Integrated Missions’ report.

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27 ‘Groundwork’ is the operative word, as short-term interventions must always complement long-term commitments.


Third, the principle of better coordination within the UN bureaucracy is equally applicable to UN-contributing countries. Effective participation in UN or UN-led missions is largely contingent upon standing institutions and integrated means, and not ad hoc committees, plug-and-play forces and rosters of experts. What is required is an institutional base, backed by permanent military and civilian staff, that is endowed with sufficient authority to bring together all relevant national instruments when a crisis emerges. Such a standing entity—much like the US-based S/CRS and UK-based PCRU—should be created primarily to: facilitate coordination at the inter-departmental level; improve national capabilities for reconstruction through, inter alia, the establishment of a reserve or standing civilian reconstruction capability; provide detailed options and strategies for participating in peace missions; work closely with bilateral and multilateral institutions, such as the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as non-governmental organisations, civil society groups and the private sector, to anticipate and mitigate conflict, and respond quickly when necessary to promote peace.

Fourth, the civilian component of peace missions must be bolstered to improve rapid response capabilities. Currently, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is exploring ways of improving in-house rapid deployment for mission start-up and reconstruction, inter alia, through the development of a roster of approximately 1000-1500 career officials that would provide DPKO with a pool of experienced personnel, able to deploy at short notice to fill core mission positions.\(^{30}\) To support this drive, DPKO’s roster initiative also includes attempts to draw civilian experts from UN-contributing countries to complement UN staff in the field. Unfortunately, this process has been marred by uncertain commitment and insufficient buy-in, not least because the majority of UN member states do not have any systems in place to systematically identify let alone deploy experts from within or outside government.

Indeed, it is uncertain—even with the recently created Peacebuilding Commission—whether UN plans to field a reliable civilian capacity for peacebuilding will be realised as UN-contributing countries themselves lack appropriate stand-by or permanent arrangements. It is unfortunate to note in this regard that current plans to institutionalise the structures requisite for the proposed African Standby Force (ASF), do not explicitly foresee the need for a dedicated civilian reconstruction capacity. If fact, AU planners anticipate that this sort of capacity should be an ad hoc addition to the regional standby brigades.\(^{31}\) Thus, without appropriate capacity available at the national or regional level, there is a danger that the new UN organ, the Peacebuilding Commission, will suffer the same fate as many other UN institutions, able to perform its analytical, policy-formulation functions, but barely able to fulfil its most important organisational, and monitoring functions, let alone its operational tasks.

Fifth, the need for civilians to match military capability and deployment timelines should also be accompanied by the need to correctly sequence and synergise military and civilian tasks. On the ground, different agencies and institutions will invariably play different roles and take priority across the spectrum of conflict. Usually, the armed forces play a leading role in providing initial security; as security improves, civilian agencies move to the forefront of humanitarian, reconstruction, and development processes. This way of sequencing will be a difficult assumption to change. For example, in post-elections DRC, international donors, although recognising that ‘everything is urgent’ in the country, have prioritised the task of creating an effective army, police and judiciary above that of helping the central government to start providing social services to its citizens.\(^{32}\) Meanwhile, soldiers inside the ‘brassage’ or reintegration camps have been known to go on the rampage in nearby villages for food and money because they do not receive regular pay. And while these camps seem to offer little but starvation and sometimes a


wage, rebel groups in Congo’s lawless east are offering the same men $60 dollars a month to carry on fighting.\(^3\) This situation has resulted in continuing abuses against the general public and threats to derail the country’s future development and democratic project.

The point is that decision-makers must consider two interrelated dynamics when working out the sequencing of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions: first, safe and secure environments are necessary, but not a sufficient ingredient for enduring stability; and second, persistent conditions of insecurity prevent sustainable reconstruction and development. In other words—and this is true of the DRC—no amount of diplomatic mediation or military coercion will win the peace if people, especially the youth, have no alternative livelihood to that of the army or militia groups. Dealing with this issue will require the on-site presence of civilian teams that can fill the gap between military peacekeeping and traditional development assistance. Since most conventional donor organisations are unable to respond quickly beyond the provision of basic humanitarian relief in this critical stage, planners should consider synergising key reconstruction capabilities alongside the military security function. In this way, more tangible opportunities can be offered to soldiers and ordinary citizens that would prefer to stop fighting, and find more ‘regular’ jobs.

Lastly, to achieve rapid delivery of basic services in the period following major conflict, planning for infrastructure reconstruction (in some case, as in Southern Sudan, construction) must begin concurrently with planning for military operations. This process poses a great analytical and technical challenge for civil-military planners, not least because it will entail being able to plan within a framework that can clarify short, mid and long-term needs and objectives for stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts. In more practical terms, integrated planning will require greater ‘interoperability’ between military and civilian staff to ensure that both groups work in full communication and mutual support of one another. Reconciling civilian and military planning procedures will be difficult; as Stephenson points out, ‘civilian practitioners of foreign assistance often take the long view, based upon years of experience. By contrast, the military is mission-oriented and tends to [resolve] a problem with the objective of overcoming it as quickly as possible’.\(^4\) While both views are important, international civilian personnel should recognize that the long-term success of a peace intervention will partly depend on their ability to make rapid and demonstrable results in order to win support and trust from local residents, even of this means operating in theatres where the mix between conflict and peace is likely to shift back and forth.

V. CONCLUSION

After the shooting stops in peace operations, the question still remains unanswered as to who will undertake to more critical function of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Usually, in the immediate aftermath of major conflict, local capacity is limited, conventional international assistance can take months to arrive, and societies that have suffered through years of conflict find themselves facing deprivation, isolation, and perennial danger.

Thus far, the main international body charged with responding to violent conflict, the UN, has generally struggled to provide host-nations with an improved situation. Although post-Cold War peace missions have moved beyond the traditional notions of peacekeeping to include some elements of peacebuilding, the nature of peacekeeping has been predominantly military. As a result, the benefits of derived from participation in violent armed conflicts often outweigh those for supporting unrewarding peace agreements; this is the reality for the unemployed youth.

This paper has attempted to suggest that, in order to ensure that local populations are offered concrete evidence of progress, civilian peacebuilding should be more closely integrated with the military peacekeeping function, to assess and execute operations that aim to fill the gap between violent conflict and lasting peace. Delivering critical infrastructure that supports the


\(^4\) On the question of civil-military interoperability, see, for example, James Stephenson, ‘Civil-military cooperation: a field perspective’, Foreign Service Journal, March 2006, pp. 55-62.
delivery of basic social services will form a crucial component of this integrated process. Without these essential services, people are faced with little option, but to support warlords and resort to a life of crime and violence for survival.

Of course, persistent conditions of insecurity prevent sustained and sustainable reconstruction. But without reconstruction, there can be no enduring stability. To ensure that reconstruction begins promptly, civil-military coordination in peace missions is critical. This calls for the establishment of new national/multilateral institutions, or the enhancement of existing ones, to bring together diverse peace mission actors, including the military, when a crisis emerges, and that can effectively articulate integrated plans down to the operational level so that delays can be avoided.

Time is of the essence in peace missions: civilians must be able to complement the use of military peacekeeping at the earliest possible stages of a mission in order to promote development. Maintaining the needed momentum toward a stable society, that is, ensuring that early reconstruction has a lasting impact, will require deploying more civilian helmets on the ground. Seeing that most UN-contributing states have many trained and experienced military peacekeeping personnel, but few civilian peacebuilding counterparts, the international community should significantly expand its civilian reconstruction capability to operate decisively in (potentially dangerous) reconstruction zones. Without a robust civilian capacity, military forces will continue shouldering the burden of reconstruction (a critical task for which military troops are not suited to undertake on a sustainable basis), and transitions are bound to be dangerously prolonged.